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5.1. Introduction
Ihale is a large landing fish site lying approximately 65 km. from Mwanza along the Mwanza-Musoma highway.
It was selected as a candidate for this study because of its proximity to Mwanza as well as bveing representative
of a large landing site. It has an average of 120 boats and three agents from the fish processing factories visit the
beach on most days. During the study, the population at Ihale was about 5,000 people, most of whom were
involved in fishing and trading activities. Farming is little practised because of the erratic rainfall patterns within
the area. The major gear types used at the landing were gillnets and long lines (Geheb, et al., 2000: 30).
Mwasonge is one of the smallest beach in the Mwanza Region's Misugwi District. It is located about 12 kms
from Mwanza, on the border between Mwanza Rural and Misugwi districts. Its total population was about 1,500
people. The main fish caught was tilapia and, on average, 5-10 boats landed at the beach daily. Fishing occurred
daily, but catches were low especially during dry seasons (Medard et al., 2000: 157). Inhabitants also relied on
farming, and grew maize, cassava, and millet. The community also farmed a vegetable garden along the shore.
The methods employed in this study are described in Chapter 2 of this volume. This paper presents the findings
of the study, and then discusses these in the light of the co-managerial debate on Lake Victoria generally and,
more specifically, in terms of co-managerial efforts in Tanzania. In its recommendations, this papers suggests
lessons from this study that need to be taken into consideration, and how this might occur.
Some of the study's more interesting findings are summarised in Table i below.
5.2. Main study findings
Community institutions that influence access/ownership offisheries
The most important community-based fisheries management institution are the Beach Management Units
(BMUs). When first imposed on communities, the Tanzanian Fisheries Department described the following as
the BMU's roles:
Monitoring illegal gear users (beach seiners, people using gill-nets with less than the minimum mesh-size,
fish driving methods, and poison). Offenders were supposed to be identified and then reported to the district
FD office.
Confiscating illegal gears and surrendering them to the FD.
Ensuring the beach environment was clean.
Ensuring that all fishing boats within their waters were registered.
Elsewhere, Medard and Geheb (2000) have considered the manner in which the BMUs were established, and
argued that BMUs were likely to become 'socialised' in such a way that they began to meet the social and
cultural objectives of the community as opposed to any conservation objectives per se. An additional problem
that we raise here is that BMIUs are, in many respects, asked to enforce rules and regulations likely to be
unpopular with the fishing communities and, as such, run the risk of being ostracised. BMUs are, nevertheless,
the most concerted attempt at including communities in fisheries management on Lake Victoria.
Summary of notable findings from Mwasonge Summary of notable findings from Ihale
The BMU at Mwasonge has managed to achieve the
following things:
Confiscated 120 nets with illegal mesh-sizes.
Managed to eliminate fishing with poisons for the
beach.
Confiscated a boat from an illegal fisher (an
outsider).
Managed to construct a pit latrine for the beach
community.
Introduced a number of bylaws for management
purposes as well as for BMU survival.
Reduced the incidence of using under-sized nets.
Kept records on the size of gear used for each boat,
serious offences, number of boats landed, number of
new fishers arrived.
Managed to develop a partnership with TAFIRI,
Ukiriguru Agricultural Institute, the District Health
Department, other BMUs.
Managed to organise a meeting for the mobilisation
of funds at the ward level.
Collected fines, which were used to cover various
BMU costs.
for transport and the cost of s, over-night costs and
night outs for reporting purposes and visiting other
beaches.
(I) Developed good relations with the village
government and sorted issues iii form of meetings.
The BMU at Ihale had managed to achieve the
following things:
Confiscated 20 nets 5 beach seines and
surrendered them to the FD.
Managed to negotiate with factory agent to build
a toilet on agreement that he would run it, and
collect money on its use, before surrendering it to
the village government.
(e) Demolished several houses to make the beach
area less crowded.
Attended various seminars on tree planting and
negotiated with forest extension officer to plant
trees at the beach and individual houses.
Managed to resolve a conflict with the Village
Government. During the last visit to the landing,
however, a new Village Executive Officer was
complicating the relationship between the BMU
and the Village Government.
Other notable issues from the landing are as follows:
Illegally-sized nets used by fishers connected to
factories are still in use and very difficult to
control.
The District Fisheries Officer allowed the
beach's beach seines to continue to operate, and
asked the BMU to closely monitor their catches.
After a week, he compared the incomes from
beach seines against those of gill-nets, and found
that the former tended to earn less than the latter.
He later told the beach seiners to surrender their
nets, and four large nets were passed on to him.
Table 1: Summary of notable issues that arose during the monitoring process.
Every village in Tanzania has a village government structure that is contained within broader ward, district,
regional and national structures. Initially, when the BMUs were introduced, the ihale Village Government
considered the new organisation a direct threat to its authority. The two organizations were, ultimately, able to
corne to terms with one another, arid iron out their mutual worries over overlapping responsibilities and
jurisdictions. Regardless of location, village governments and their internal administrative structures play an
important role in the administration of Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishery.
Otherwise, fishing communities are often characterised by a plethora of social and economic organisations
of varying sizes. At Mwasonge, these were virtually all women's groups with some form of revolving credit
scheme for their members. While these also existed at Ihale, the men's football and women's netball teams
(both called Manchesta'). Geheb, in the introduction to this volume, describes the teams as follows: "They
occupied an ambiguous place on the institutional landscape of the village, and certainly appeared to be more
than merely sporting institutions. With so many of the beach's inhabitants involved in the teams, they
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represented a point during which the entire community could converge upon itself, to create a focus moment during
which friendships could he reaffirmed, new ones created, discussion initiated and politics debated".
Communities and externally-introduced management measures
During the set-up process, the community revealed how they faced various conflicting issues regarding the
formation of BMUs which, in particular, related to the failure to fully involve all actors (see Medard et al. 2000,
200 1; Geheb, et al. 2000; Medard, 2000; Onyango, 2000). Of particular concern to community members was the
failure to adequately explain where the Village Government fitted in, and how the BMU and Village
Government's activities and jurisdictions were mutually exclusive. In the process of its operation, the BMUs
confirmed that they had faced a number of problems which were difficult to solve without recourse to the
Village Government. At both Ihale and Mwasonge, the following difficulties were encountered:
Recognition of the BMLJ by fishers: in both communities, other fishers who were not in the BMU did not
recognize it as a legitimate institution, and perceived the organisation as an FD-appointed unit, and not a
community-based one.
At both Ihale and Mwasomige the village leaders were concerned that they were not involved in the
formation of the BMUs and that they were bypassed during the formulation process. In particular, they
were concerned that they had no responsibilities within this new institution. In any case, they did not think
that the FD could simply come to their villages and for a group without first consulting with village
representatives (Medard, 2000).
Community acceptance of the BÌvIU role
During the monitoring process, both BMU groups and comnniunities experienced problems amid decided to solve
these by drawing on local opportunities and support. The problems they encountered and the way in which these
were solved were as follows:
Successftml discussions and negotiations occurred between the village government and BMUs after the
latter realised that they would be unable to work in isolation from other, village-based, administration. In
this way, the BMUs and the village governments were able to work together to achieve a number of
outputs, which included the construction of toilet and shower facilities at Ihale, to combat waste on the
beach, to plan settlenient on the beach, to identify new sources of funding besides village government
sources, involving other institutions in sanitation and hygiene matters, and persuading municipal levy
collectors to contribute towards the maintenance ofcleanliness at the landing sites. All ofthis was done
hand-in-hand with the village government, which was regarded as a trusted support institution, which
could provide the BMU with various kinds of security, and guarantee it in various official
communications and contracts at the local level.
The IMU and the village government managed to agree upon the division of funds gathered by the BMU
through fines and landing fees.
(e) As a way of raising funds, the BMUs introduced fisheries management byelaws, against viich they could
collect fine. The BMUs could, in this way, be financially independent.
To ensure that their relationship with the FD remained good, the BMUs took to reporting to the FD district
fisheries offices frequently, and developed filing systems in which they lodged their reports, which
ìncluded reports on illegal gear use, and those who had failed to pay license or boat registration fees. The
BMUs, in addition, confiscated a number of illegal gears, which they surrendered to the FD, and worked
to control theft on the lake.
Organizing fund-raising strategy with other groups on how to stand on their own financially.
Individuals who were unable to perform the duties assigned to the BMUs resigned.
Some BMU members decided to misuse the funds gathered by the BMUs, with the result, at Mwasonge,
that the BMU was dissolved by the Fisheries Department (FD) amid a new one formed.
ln order to strengthen their positions, the BMUs sought out partnership with external institutions and
individuals, such as fish processing factories, other BMUs at other beaches, and NGOs.
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Understanding the benefits required by communities in order to adopt and/or develop regulatory institutions.
(a) Financial support. The communities recognise the need for financial resources if they are to effectively
perform the BMU's responsibilities. Their primary source of funding is via fines, and some of the byclaws
at the two communities were as follows:
Table 2: Bylaws as source of funds for BMUs.
At Ihale, members ofthe BMU were each supposed to contribute Tshs. 3,000/- towards the maintenance
ofthe BMU, while BMU members at Mwasonge agreed to pay Tshs. 1,500/-. This was not, however, a
consistent source of funds as members could not always afford to make their contributions. When the
monitoring trip visited Ihale in October 2001, the BMU had saved Tshs. 45,OOO/2, while Mwasonge's
BMU had saved Tshs. 3000/- At Iliale, fines contributed about 10% towards the BMUs budget, 15% from
landing fees for fishermen and about 75% from the contributions of BMU staff,
Material support: at both beaches, patrol equipment, sanitation and other beach facilities were all
mentioned as possible future investments should the BMUs be able to generate enough funds. The BMUs
at both beaches had received gumboots and sweaters from the Fisheries Department (FD) as part of what
was considered 'patrol equipment'. BMU members said that they hoped that the government could donate
more, such as patrol boats, fish bandas and fish processing equipment, which would assit the BMUs to
carry out their duties.
Human resources, moral and expertise support: during various workshops and meetings with the
community, they expressed the need for the communities to be educated in various fisheries management
matters. During various workshops, to which representatives from Ihale and Mwasonge were invited, the
communities expressed their appreciation at being involved. They were also very appreciative of the visits
by the monitoring teams, and liked to be able to discuss the fishery, its management, and various options
for the future with us.
Shared commitment amongst all stakeholders: the communities indicated that they expected all
stakeholders to share their commitments in the management of the lake. They included the FD, industrial
fish processors, levy collectors, fisheries research institutions and others as 'stakeholders'
Interactive dialogue: the communities wanted an interactive dialogue between partners and resource
beneficiaries. At Mwasonge, for instance, the BMU leaders visited another beach which was funded by
the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP) and the FD, and which had patrol boats
and some sanitary facilities. Negotiations for a wider monitoring strategy including all beaches
2 During the study, USD i = Tshs. 890.00
Mwasonge Ihale
(a) Drunk people not allowed to fish; fine: Tshs. 500/-
(b) No fighting ori beach or while fishing; fine Tshs.
1,000/-
(c) New arrivals to the landing should have a letter of
introduction; if not, they are chased away.
(d) No theft is allowed. Captured thieves must replace the
item stolen and are fined Tshs. 10,000/-
(e) Replacement of property and a fine of 10,000 was set.
(1) New fishers must pay a landing fee of Tshs. 100/-. if
not, they are sent away.
(g) Each fishing boat is supposed to contribute a fish the
BMU to the BMU. If not, they are prevented from
fish i ng.
(h) No fishing is allowed at night.
(i) No fish may be landed at night.
(a) Bathing in the lake is banned; fine: Tshs.
5,0001- to be introduced.
(b) Washing clothes and utensils at the beach
banned; fine: Tshs. 1,500/-.
(e) Fish have to be handled with care and not
thrown on to the ground; fine: Tshs. 5,000/-
(d) Urinating and defecating near the lake
banned; fine of Tshs. 5,000/-
(e) Illegal gear was fined Tshs. 1,000/-
(f) New fishers were charged a Tshs. 1000/-
arrival fee (makanyagio)
Sinai! mesh sizes.
Unregistered boats.
Unlicensed boats.
Confiscate nets
Banned from fishing
Theft of gear!
equipment.
Report the matter to police station
Report the matter to the District Fisheries Office
Poison fishing
Fiure 1: O.tioris available for the Mwason e Beach BMU to resort offenders and sanction them
Understanding of the factors that contribute to the survival of community-based institutions over time.
At the survey sites, several factors contribute to the survival of the institutions over time.
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in a ward, which would include mutual fund-raising activities, was one management option raised by the
Mwasonge BMU (Medard et al. 200: 1 69). Likewise, at Ihale, the BMU had planned a community fund-
raising activity with a view to inviting neighbouring BMUs, governmental and non-governmental
institutions, individuals and other resource users together to form an umbrella fisheries management
organisation.
Enabling legislation: the two communities need enabling legislation to allow them to draw the lines of
authority and responsibility for resource management. They needed skill, knowledge, support and to be
trusted so that if such legislation were to be issued, then they would be able to implement and enforce it.
Ofparticular concern to the two communities was the fact that they had no moderating influence over any
FD excesses - while they could dismiss errant BMU members, the same was not true of corrupt FD
officers. In addition, some fishers simply played the BMU off against the FD, claiming only to listen to
the FD and not the BMU - this latter difficulty could well have been solved by the legal endorsement and
clarification of the BMU's roles. Interviews with the FD and the BMUs confirmed that some of the
government's fisheries regulations are not clear, others are out-dated, and many respondents were
reluctant to seek recourse from the law because of the excessive time and money that such actions
implied. Figure i shows the courses of action available to the BMU for the reporting of various offences.
As the gravity of the offence increases, so too the likelihood that the BMU will seek solutions from
outside the community. Depending on the BMU's own reading of the offence and the circumstances under
which it was committed, cases might have been referred to the FD, where a similar assessment could
occur. The FD might then seek to sanction the offender or send hirn/her on to the police.
Inclusion ofpolitical figures in the management process: respondents argued that political leaders should
have a role to play in Lake Victoria's management because, in this way, they could lend influence and
credibility to the process. At Ihale, respondents argued that trying to negotiate a satisfactory outcome with
levy collectors (who were politically connected and legitimised) was very difficult. Ihale's inhabitants felt
that if they paid a levy to the municipal council, then tangible services ought to be made available to them.
At Mwasonge, the influence of political forces was felt during the elections in 2000, when political
aspirants encouraged people to disregard the BMU and other fisheries regulations in an effort to win their
support.
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Absence ofcorruption amongst the members. at Mwasonge the first BMU was dissolved when some of its
members were found to be corrupt. At Ihale, the misappropriation of funds, and the conflict between the
BMTJ and FD as a result of corruption and continuing beach seines use, was a major problem. In either
case, corruption was seen as a major reason for BMUs to fai!.
Misappropriation offunds: at Ihale, the former Chairman to the BMU and another member had received
some money for attending a workshop, which they failed to report to the vi!lage government nor the
BMU. When it was dkcovered, they were dismissed from the BMU.
Improvement ofinarlreting system. at the landings surveyed for this study, juveni!e fish were being sold to
both industrial fish processors. This cannot, of course, be sustained in the long-run, and will almost
certainly lead to the demise of community-based institutions if it is not stopped. There is a need to
restructure the market and negotiate with foreign buyers, as well as local consumers, in order to stop this
practise.
Institution abiding to formulated laws, bylaws and regulations: if community-based institutions are to
survive, they will need to develop laws and bylaws which should be strictly adhered to by community
members. If there are loopholes, free-riding may occur. Hence, enforcement is needed, which is equitably
applied. At Ihale, fishers who were connected to the fish processing factories often used illegal gear, and it
was unfair when the BM1J seized the nets of individual fishers, unconnected to the industries, and left the
more powerful fishers alone.
Expectation of higher benefits and rewards: the communities visited expected to receive financial rewards
once they learned that the establishment of the BMUs was connected a major international project
(LVEMP). When they realised that these were not forthcoming, some BMU members resigned, and other
said that they have difficulty operating effectively without financial assistance.
Divisive leadership: when a new Village Executive Officer (VEO) assumed office at Ihale, he claimed not
to understand the role of the BMU. He claimed that the BMU was just a group of people looking after
their own interests and not those of the community as a whole. Therefore, he wanted to bring the BMU
under the control of the village government and, in particular, he wanted to control the funds they
collected. Lack of awareness, therefore, threatened the future of the BMU. It is important for community-
based institutions to have clear roles and responsibilities, which should be known by individuals and other
institutions.
Government support: there is a need to have strong administrative, political and social support from the
government if community-based institutions are to succeed.
Internal assessments and objectives: it is necessary that institutions should have clear objectives against
which they can continuously assess and re-assess themselves. For example, objectives concerning the
behaviour and ethics of leaders are important, such that if these ai-e violated, leaders can be dismissed. If
they are not, and the ethics and visions of the group are weak, then members of the institution may think
such behaviour is 'okay' and follow the example of the leader.
Identfi cation of how extension services can be delivered to fisheries-dependent communities
Amongst the various activities of this survey, it sought to identify ways in which extension services could be
delivered to communities. and what varieties of services would be needed.
(a) Understanding the needs and demands of the community. for extension services to be effective, the needs
and demands of the community ticed to be identified. It seems reasonable that communities should agree
amongst themselves what these may be, and that they should form the basis of their relationship with
extension workers. This relationship can only be understood as an evolutionary process, developing
towards trust and confidence of both parties to act upon their promises. Hence, corruption within the FD
has meant that some fishing community members are reluctant to trust the FD to effectively deliver
extension services, let along fisheries management outputs. By a similar token, the way in which both
partners in the fisheries management relationship carries out their activities is of importance. For example,
early on the formation of the BMUs, rifts occurred between the FD and the communities because of the
way in which the BMUs were established. Careful consideration of both the FD's and the communities'
needs and demands may have averted this difficulty.
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(b) Acceptance of challenges andJ?fficult situations: Extension workers should expect to be challenged, and
that each member in the management partnership may attempt to test the strength of the relationship. The
mechanisms to diffuse confrontations and to rebuild mutua! confidence need to be amongst the tools that
extension workers bring to landing sites.
(e) Mobilisation of local funds for the provision offacilities: the community and extension department should
be able identify how local resources can be generated for then various activities of local institutions (and,
indeed, those of the extension service), instead of relying on donor agencies. An example of where this
has occurred is at Ihale, where the BMU was able to persuade a fish collection agent to build toìlet and
shower facilities on the beach, and at Mwasonge, where the BMU has sought ways to fund its patrolling
activities.
53 Discussion
In this section, we synthesise what we believe to be the salient issues to be derived from the surveys at
Mwasonge and Ihale, and what they tell us about community level management and the operations of the Beach
Management Units. We conclude this section with comments on the lessons derived from this study and how
these relate to the management of Tanzania's Lake Victoria fisheries.
The manner in which the BMUs were established was a repeated concern at both landing sites. Fisheries
Department (FD) officers arrived, selected a handful of new members, prescribed their responsibilities, and then
left, and exercise that typically lasted less than a day. Ihale's and Mwasonge's residents felt that greater care
should have been given to discussing the roles of the new institutions and the ways iii which their members were
selected. At Mwasonge, indeed, several members were known fish poisoners, a revelation that forced the FD to
intervene and disband the organisation.
An additìonal, and very serious, bone of contention was the failure of the PD to consider how the BMUs would
integrate and associate with established power structures at the landing sites, particularly the village government.
The conflict threatened to destroy the BMU, and it was only with some deft inanoeuvring by BMU members that
the crisis was averted. Of note was the nature of this conflict: the fact that the BMU was gathering revenue at the
landing, and that this was not being divided with the village government.
Despite these problems, however, the BMIJs have been established at these landings, and a large part of this
study has been to consider their efficacy. Elsewhere (Medard and Geheb, 2000), we have raised the concern that
the activities of the ]3MUs are more concerned with the achievement of various social and livelihood objectives
(be these of BMU members or of the community as a whole), and not fisheries management or conservation
objectives per se. At Mwasonge, the BMU sought to generate funds that would enable it to patrol set gear on the
lake in an attempt to prevent theft, while at Ihale, the BMU was able to persuade a fish collection agent to build
lavatory and shower facilities at the landing, which would appease the concerns of international buyers.
Such evidence as exists to suggest that BMUs have actually carried out fisheries management roles (such as
seizing illegal gear at Ihale), can also be explained in terms of attempting to keep the FD happy - in many
respects, such activities can, it seems, only occur at the end of an intense series of local negotiations designed to
ensure that local community members understand that the seizures at aimed at maintaining the peace with the
FD; failing to carry out such negotiations could, after all, result in the BMU being ostracised by the very
community from which its members are derived. Which gear is seized and from whom is also a political process:
at Ihale, gear provided to Ihale-based fishers by the fish processing factories was often illegal. Concerned about
upsetting the fish processing factories, from whom a large part of Ihale's income is derìved, was sufficient to
ensure that this gear was not seized. The same was true of beach seines owned by BMU members which were,
initially, allowed to continue operating; and poisoners being present on the Mwasonge BMU, and working to
ensure that their activities were ignored.
There exists, therefore, a strong sense of conflicting interests between the BMU, its members and the
conservation of the fisheries. These conflicts occur as follows:
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between the BMU and the community: the BMU is reluctant to enforce fisheries regulations, lest they are
then ostracised by their own communities.
Between tIte BMUs and the fish processing factories: it would be against the interests of the BMUs to
prevent the landing ofjuvenile fish if these are wanted by the factories, given the latter's contributions to
community incomes.
Between livelihood and conservation objectives: related to points (a) and (b) is the difficulty that it makes
no sense to enforce the regulations if the regulations upset the community's access to livelihoods.
In addition, note should be made of the often difficult political conditions that the BMU finds itself in, and
which will often determine the nature and outcome of its actions. These relate to:
the BMU's relationship with the Fisheries Department (FD).
The BMU's relationship with the community from which it is drawn.
The BMU's relationship with fish processing factories.
The BMU's relationship with municipal levy collectors; and,
the BMU's relationship with other outside sources of power and influence which may alter the nature of
its relationship with the actors indicated in points (a) - (d).
These problems, and the measures that the BMUs take to try and ameliorate them, are not unusual for nascent
organisations. What needs to be ensured, however, is that if BMUs are to become viable actors in the
management of the fishery, they will need, firstly, to be protected from repercussions that may result from taking
management-related decisions; and, second, that such protection is not abused by the BMUs so that they can
take advantage of the power that this represents, and use it as a means to extort graft and inflict other kinds of
abuse upon their communities.
There exists, therefore, a political economy surrounding the functions of Tanzania's BMUs. The challenge for
management, therefore, is to draw upon those points where fisheries conservation coincides with social and
livelihood goals. Those fisheries management goals that faIl beyond this zone of converge need either to be
delegated elsewhere, or else the necessary incentives and/or modifications must be put in place to ensure that the
BMUs will carry them out.
5.4. Conclusions and recommendations
This study has shown that co-management depends, in part, on the existence of material, social and financial
incentives, lt also requires, in part, that resource management problems, such as catch declines and resource use
conflicts, are observed by the partners in the arrangement. To be successful, it is important that co-management
should incorporate facets such as institutional capacity-building, nurturing of the self-help spirit, the sharing of
experiences amongst stakeholders and the development of collaboration and partnerships amongst stakeholders.
Political leaders need to have a stake in resources management, because continuiug support from political power
is required if laws are to be enforced and management gains are to be preserved. In addition, gains will be
possible if resource users and the government (political leaders) have a shared commitment to sound resource
management and are willing to take decisive action. It is recommended that sensitisation, the creation of
awareness, education, negotiations and consultative meetìngs should be encouraged and applied during the
process of providing communities with resource management capacities.
This study has noted that purely community-level management can be difficult in a complex situation
characterised by multiple stakeholders with varied claims and interests in the resource. The internationalisation'
of the fishery via the Nile perch export industry has meant that community involvement in its management needs
to be connected to, and supported by, a wider network that ensures that their interests and responsibilities may be
felt from the lake shore through to the international arena.
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There exist conflicting interests among stakeholders and the institutions. To mediate those conflicts, local
participation and joint decision-making of ali major group users are necessary. Importantly, dialogue and
negotiations must be opened amongst stakeholders. This may provide a potential avenue for resolving the more
contentious issues that exist between stakeholders and within stakeholder groups.
The fact that BMUs remain answerable to the Fisheries Department (FD) but, at the same time, are not
recognised by the law, could prove problematic. Under these circumstances, the responsibilities that the FD
seeks the BMUs to uphold have no legal sanction under the law; they could, in fact, be illegal, and provide no
conduit for communities to be involved in a mutual management exercise where their inputs, perspectives and
interests are legally represented in the management process.
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